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In recent decades, there has been growing attention to the overuse of caesarean section (CS) globally. In
light of a high CS rate at a university hospital in Tanzania, we aimed to explore obstetric caregivers'
rationales for their hospital's CS rate to identify factors that might cause CS overuse. After participant
observations, we performed 22 semi-structured individual in-depth interviews and 2 focus group dis-
cussions with 5e6 caregivers in each. Respondents were consultants, specialists, residents, and mid-
wives. The study relied on a framework of naturalistic inquiry and we analyzed data using thematic
analysis. As a conceptual framework, we situated our ﬁndings in the discussion of how transparency and
auditing can induce behavioral change and have unintended effects. Caregivers had divergent opinions
on whether the hospital's CS rate was a problem or not, but most thought that there was an overuse of
CS. All caregivers rationalized the high CS rate by referring to circumstances outside their control. In
private practice, some stated they were affected by the economic compensation for CS, while others
argued that unnecessary CSs were due to maternal demand. Residents often missed support from their
senior colleagues when making decisions, and felt that midwives pushed them to perform CSs. Many
caregivers stated that their fear of blame from colleagues and management in case of poor outcomes
made them advocate for, or perform, CSs on doubtful indications. In order to lower CS rates, caregivers
must acknowledge their roles as decision-makers, and strive to minimize unnecessary CSs. Although
auditing and transparency are important to improve patient safety, they must be used with sensitivity
regarding any unintended or counterproductive effects they might have.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In recent decades, caesarean section (CS) rates have risen
globally (Betran et al., 2007). As a result, there has been growing
attention to the under- and over-use of CSs within different settings
and the problems unnecessary CSs might cause (Althabe and
Belizan, 2006). Unnecessary CSs can put strains on both institu-
tional and individual resources and threaten health equity in low-
and middle-income countries (Gibbons et al., 2012). CS performed
on non-medical indications in low-resource settings is associatedp), andrew.mgaya@kbh.uu.se
ga), hkidanto@yahoo.co.uk
ter), birgitta.essen@kbh.uu.se
Ltd. This is an open access article uwith higher maternal risks than vaginal delivery (Souza et al., 2010)
and the CS scar can cause problems in subsequent pregnancies
(Silver, 2012). CS might also have psychological implications for the
mother, with slower recovery, more time away from her family, and
increased pain (Wendland, 2007).
Although there has been a media rhetoric of women being “too
posh to push”, implying that women want CS to avoid labor pains
and have an “easier” birth (Lynn Bourgeault et al., 2008), most
research on women in both high-and middle-income countries
(Hopkins, 2000; Lynn Bourgeault et al., 2008; Mazzoni et al., 2011),
as well as low-income countries (Chigbu and Iloabachie, 2007;
Khan et al., 2012), argue that there is little evidence for such a
declaration. Instead, previous literature suggests that obstetrical
policies, a change in doctors' perceptions of CS, and a lower
threshold for performing CS can explain the current trend (Bagheri
et al., 2013; Bailit, 2012; Habiba et al., 2006; Hopkins, 2000; Lynnnder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
H. Litorp et al. / Social Science & Medicine 143 (2015) 232e240 233Bourgeault et al., 2008; Maaløe et al., 2012; Monari et al., 2008;
Murray, 2000). Reasons for obstetric caregivers to perform CSs on
doubtful indications are suggested to be convenience (Bagheri
et al., 2013; Bailit, 2012; Murray, 2000), economic incentives
(Bagheri et al., 2013; Hopkins, 2000; Murray, 2000), fear of legal
consequences (Bagheri et al., 2013; Fuglenes et al., 2009; Habiba
et al., 2006), and a wish to keep private patients happy (Murray,
2000), but there are also reports that stafﬁng patterns affect CS
decision-making (Bailit, 2012). As high CS rates have been a concern
mostly for high-and middle-income countries, there is little
research from the developing world exploring doctors' and mid-
wives' perceptions of high CS rates (Chigbu et al., 2010).
In light of a high CS rate at a university hospital in Tanzania
(Litorp et al., 2013), we wished to explore obstetric caregivers' ra-
tionales for their hospital's CS rate in order to identify factors that
might cause CS overuse.We conceptualize our study based on three
empirical observations at the hospital. First, the CS rate has
increased rapidly among low-risk groups, for example multipara
without previous CS scars, suggesting that many CSs are performed
on questionable indications (Litorp et al., 2013). Second, the
maternal mortality ratio has increased (Litorp et al., 2013) and CS
complications account for a large proportion of the hospital's se-
vere maternal morbidity and deaths (Litorp et al., 2014). Third,
women often fear to undergo CS, while caregivers are prepared to
take high maternal risks in order to guarantee a good perinatal
outcome (Litorp et al., 2015).
In the current study, we situate our discussionwithin the debate
of how transparency and auditing (Strathern, 2000) can have un-
intended effects through reactivity mechanisms (Espeland and
Sauder, 2007; McGivern and Fischer, 2012). These concepts have
not, to our knowledge, been applied before to understand high CS
rates. In the following section we explain transparency, auditing,
and reactivity mechanisms. We then present our research methods
and ﬁndings. Finally, by taking a social constructionist approach
(Erlandson et al., 1993; Menzies, 1960; Waring, 2009) and using our
conceptual framework, we outline a model to explain what role
transparency might have in CS overuse.
1.1. Transparency and reactivity
Transparency is ﬁxed and published rules within a clearly
demarcated ﬁeld of activity that are accessible to everyone (Hood,
2007). It advocates openness, independent scrutiny, and account-
ability, and make activity visible to the public (McGivern and
Fischer, 2012), but can also involve reporting within smaller
groups of experts (Hood, 2007). Transparency can include rankings
(Espeland and Sauder, 2007) or auditing, of which the latter has
become widespread both inside and outside medical practice
(Strathern, 2000; The Cochrane Collaboration, 2005). In a medical
audit cycle, care is critically analyzed and measured against stan-
dards, and feed-back is continually provided to the staff (The
Cochrane Collaboration, 2005). In recent years, the use of audit
has been increasingly promoted to reduce the number of adverse
outcomes within obstetric care (World Health Organization, 2004),
and audits are currently becoming more common in developing
countries (Richard et al., 2009).
Despite its potential advantages, there are, however, reports that
auditing may be associated with a “blame game” (Combs Thorsen
et al., 2014) and have unintended, and even counterproductive,
effects (McGivern and Fischer, 2012; Strathern, 2000; The Cochrane
Collaboration, 2005). The notion among professionals that they are
continually observed, evaluated, and measured, can induce so
called reactivity mechanisms (Espeland and Sauder, 2007;
McGivern and Fischer, 2012). These can include emotional re-
actions, such as fear, anxiety, guilt, and shame, which might lead totension, distress, and uncertainty (Menzies, 1960; Nicolini et al.,
2011), but reactivity might also encompass a reconstruction of
truth. In an organization or group, diverging realities are con-
structed to form convergent conclusions and realities, which act as
a framework for the way in which people behave (Erlandson et al.,
1993; Menzies, 1960), and when staff share narratives and notions
with each other, new truths, norms, and customs can develop
(Waring, 2009). Previous literature has described how staff cope
with anxiety and fear by detachment and denial of feelings
(Menzies, 1960). But staff might also react with a shift in focus, for
example by concentrating on the work made visible in the auditing
process whilst neglecting other obligations (McGivern and Ferlie,
2007), prioritizing to safeguard themselves over what is best for
their clients, or focusing on the outcome of the evaluation process
rather than the outcome of the client (Espeland and Sauder, 2007;
McGivern and Fischer, 2010, 2012).
2. Methods
2.1. Setting
We performed our study at a university hospital in Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania. The Tanzanian health care system has a hierar-
chical structure, in which most deliveries take place at health
centres and peripheral hospitals and the university hospital serves
as a teaching and referral institution. After an upgrade of the pe-
ripheral hospitals in Dar es Salaam in the ﬁrst years of the 21st
century, the proportion of referred patients at the university hos-
pital increased (Litorp et al., 2013), and the hospital strengthened
its position as a tertiary institution. Still, however, two-thirds of the
hospital's 9,000 annual deliveries are self-referred. Since 2004, the
obstetric department runs as a public-private partnership, where
costs for public patients are covered by the government and costs
for private patients are debited to patients or their insurance
companies. After its introduction, private practice has gradually
increased and currently accounts for 25% of the deliveries. Women
with private status are attended by the same staff as public patients,
but they select a specialist whom they see continually during
antenatal care and who is responsible for their delivery. During
labor, women with private status are allocated to separate wards.
When a private patient undergoes CS, doctors receive extra eco-
nomic compensation. In recent years, the hospital's CS rate has
increased from 16% in 2000 to 51% in 2011 among public patients,
and from 36% in 2004 to 50% in 2011 among private patients.
The obstetric department is well-staffed with senior consultants
(specialists with more than ten years' experience), specialists, res-
idents (medical doctors doing their three-year specialist training),
interns (medical graduates doing their one-year practical training),
and midwives. CS decisions are formally taken by a doctor. The on-
call team consists of one specialist, two residents, and one intern
who are on duty for a 24 h shift. During the night, the specialist can
rest either at home or at the department, but should be available for
phone consultations and be able to come to the hospital within two
hours. All specialists can delegate the responsibility of their private
patients to the residents on call. After each call, residents and in-
terns report at the doctors' morning meeting and midwives report
at the midwives' meeting. Maternal death audits are conducted
monthly since 1973 by a maternal mortality committee comprised
of obstetricians, midwives, nurses, and the heads of the pharmacy
and the central laboratory services. The committee has to comment
on quality of care, identify gaps in the management, and decide if
negligence, lack of resources, or understandable circumstances led
to the death. All of the committee's recommendations are noted
and handed to the hospital management for action, and every
week, cases are discussed at ameetingwith the department staff. In
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2009) and is currently performed every two to three months. The
audit process handles adverse outcomes among both public and
private patients. Apart from audits, if staff members are involved in
adverse outcomes that might be due to misconduct, they are
required to write a statement to the hospital management. Patients
and relatives can also ﬁle complaints on care providers to a special
unit, which might investigate their query.
2.2. Study procedures
Since ﬁrsthand experience is both the starting point and ﬁlter
through which data are interpreted (Wolcott, 2008), we beganwith
participant observations. During six months in 2012, and brieﬂy in
2010 and 2014, the main researcher, a PhD-student and resident in
obstetrics, took part in meetings, rounds, antenatal clinics, and
work at the labor ward at the university hospital and in one of the
peripheral hospitals. Through this work, she was both an active and
passive member of the medical team (Erlandson et al., 1993). Most
observations were done with an “hang around” approach (Wolcott,
2008), while other included detailed note-keeping.
In addition, we performed semi-structured individual in-depth
interviews and focus group discussions (FGD) with obstetric care-
givers, in order to reﬂect individual experiences and perceptions as
well as capture opinions in light of social norms and expectations.
Caregivers were approached and orally informed about the study
by two research group members employed as obstetricians at the
department. In the recruitment, we tried to obtain variation in sex,
age, professional status, and working experience. The main
researcher interviewed informants in English in January 2014 at
different private locations at their work place. As we saw that
midwives' responses were less expansive than those from doctors,
possibly resulting from language barriers and the main researcher's
position as a physician and “outsider”, additional interviews with
midwives were conducted in Kiswahili in June 2014 by a PhD and
midwife. Questions posed were open-ended and included re-
spondents' experiences of CS, perceptions about the hospital's CS
rate, and the CS decision process. Probing follow-up questions
explored their opinions on reasons for the high CS rate, theworking
environment, and the interaction between staff. FGDs were held in
English with midwives and doctors in separate groups. To initiate
the discussions, participants were asked to reﬂect on the hospital's
CS rate after being shown a graph of the CS rate between 2000 and
2011. The main researcher kept ﬁeld notes and a reﬂexive journal
(Erlandson et al., 1993) throughout data collection and analysis.
2.3. Participants
We performed 22 individual interviews and 2 FGDs with 5e6
participants in each. Interviews and FGDs were audio recorded and
lasted 35e80 min. The age range of the respondents was 27e70
years and their working experience in obstetrics was 2e45 years.
Respondents weremidwives (14), residents (11), specialists (5), and
senior consultants (2). All midwives and a third of the doctors were
female. No-one asked to participate refused.
2.4. Analysis
The study relied on a framework of naturalistic inquiry, inwhich
the design of the study is not fully established when the study
begins (Erlandson et al., 1993). Analysis started during the early
interview phase in order to develop additional questions that could
be incorporated into subsequent interviews. After ten interviews
with doctors, ﬁve interviews withmidwives, and two FGDs, no new
information was retrieved, and we decided that we had metsaturation. The last interviews were mainly used for member-
checks, where we veriﬁed data with the new respondents. The
main researcher transcribed the interviews and FGDs verbatim
shortly after they had been conducted. Interviews in Kiswahili were
transcribed in Kiswahili and translated to English by one of the
research group members. During analysis, repeated discussions
were held between members of the research team, including both
medical professionals and a professor in medical anthropology.
Through these discussions, data were peer checked for authenticity
with the two research group members working at the department,
and ﬁndings were also presented to and peer checked with the
hospital staff at a work shop in January 2015. After multiple read-
ings of the transcripts, a list of codes was generated that reﬂected
interesting aspects of the data, and repeated similarities, patterns,
and differences across the respondents were identiﬁed and inter-
preted into candidate themes using thematic analysis (Braun and
Clark, 2006). Themes were then reviewed and revised repeatedly
until they cohered meaningfully but with clear distinctions be-
tween them. After this analysis was done, we combined the con-
cepts of transparency (Hood, 2007; McGivern and Fischer, 2010,
2012; Strathern, 2000) and reactivity mechanisms (Allsop and
Mulcahy, 1998; Espeland and Sauder, 2007; McGivern and
Fischer, 2012) to outline a model from which we could under-
stand and discuss our ﬁndings.
2.5. Ethics
Clearance to conduct the study was obtained from the Ethics
Board at the University to which the hospital is afﬁliated, and we
received oral informed consent from all respondents. Since two of
the research groupmembers were employed at the department, we
were concerned that residents and midwives might feel uncom-
fortable to talk freely, knowing that their responses would be
shared with these senior colleagues. Therefore, recordings and
transcripts were made anonymous before they were shared with
other research group members.
3. Results
Caregivers had divergent opinions on reasons for the hospital's
high CS rate, whether it was a problem or not, and whether CS was
overused among both private and public, or only private, patients.
Caregivers witnessed of a range of situations where CSs were per-
formed on doubtful indications: diagnoses such as fetal distress and
obstructed labor were misused, doctors and midwives were
reluctant to let women with previous scars try labor, induction of
labor was seldom practiced or usually disrupted at an early stage,
and the declining experience in instrumental deliveries led to un-
necessary operations. Some respondents witnessed that CS in-
dications were made up, so that unjustiﬁed CSs could be performed
without being questioned. The reasons for themedically unjustiﬁed
CSs were, in different ways, linked to the concepts of transparency
and reactivity mechanisms, which will be discussed in-depth later.
In the following paragraphs, we present ﬁve themes that we
identiﬁed as caregivers' rationales for the high CS rate: factors
outside caregivers' control, private practice, the specialisteresident
interaction, the residentemidwife interaction, and fear and blame.
3.1. Factors outside caregivers' control
While a few caregivers reﬂected on their own role in the high CS
rate, most respondents pointed to external factors; “So many rea-
sons are coming from outside. Our hospital is not the source of the CSs”
(Midwife B). The most prominent reason caregivers emphasized
was the university hospital's status as a referral institution,
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personnel at antenatal clinics were too inexperienced to detect
danger signs, which caused delays, aggravation of illness, and
eventually CS. Peripheral hospitals were described as over-
crowded, under-equipped, under-staffed, and unable to provide
the required CSs. Negligent personnel at these hospitals, in com-
bination with an inefﬁcient referral system, caused delays that left
caregivers at the university hospital no other option than CS. Also
women were mentioned as a cause for rising CS rates. Because the
age of ﬁrst-time mothers had increased, births had become more
complicated, which led to more CSs. Changes in lifestyle and
nutrition required more CSs because women had become more
obese and suffered from “western diseases”. Caregivers also stated
that women's low educational level made them arrive to hospital
late, when complications had already arisen. Another problem
frequently mentioned was lack of equipment, such as ultrasound
and cardio-tochograph-machines, which made diagnoses impre-
cise, and shortage of staff, which made it difﬁcult to monitor labor
adequately and encouraged the use of CS.
3.2. Private practice
Doctors were generally outspoken regarding the economic
incentive for CSs in private patients. Some considered CS to involve
morework, which justiﬁed the payment, while others regarded the
extra income as a compensation for their low salary. Caregivers had
different opinions to what extent money affected decisions, but
most thought it made them do more CSs. CS was, by some,
considered faster, easier, and more convenient; “With CS e I mini-
mize my time and I earn more!” (Specialist C). Many stressed that as
they were personally responsible for the delivery outcomes in their
private patients, and adverse events might lead to patient com-
plaints or bad reputation, private practice promoted the use of CS.
CS decisions in private patients were taken by the specialist alone,
and there was no consensus on what indications CSs in private
patients should be performed. All caregivers declared maternal
request among private patients to be one of the largest reasons for
the high CS rate, since they believed women wanted to assure a
good perinatal outcome and avoid labor pains; “In the end of the day,
when they come to deliver, they are so weak, they cannot push the
babies (…) So the patients themselves are the ones requesting for CS,
because they cannot tolerate the labor pain” (Resident E). Some
specialist were afraid of losing their private patients if they refused
to perform CS on maternal request; “What are you going to do? Then
I'll do it [CS]! Because she has already decided! Or she will go to
someone else.”(Specialist D). In the FGD with residents, however,
there was a debate whether CS on demand in private patients
should be considered malpractice.
3.3. Specialist-resident interaction
Senior and junior doctors agreed that residents could take CS
decisions without consulting the specialist in straight-forward
cases, but should call the specialist regarding complicated pa-
tients. When probed about their opinion of residents' CS decisions,
however, most specialists thought that decisions during calls were
often taken on vague indications. Specialists were concerned that
residents were inexperienced, had poor skills in instrumental de-
livery, and either had false conﬁdence or were too anxious; “Maybe
they say that it was ‘fetal distress’ but it was not fetal distress, it was
‘doctor's distress' … [laughter]” (Specialist D). Specialists described
the residents, but also other specialists, as impatient; “People don't
want to wait too long. Rather than waiting the whole night, they take a
short-cut.” (Senior consultant B). All specialists wanted the residents
to consult themmore often, and some felt confused why they werenot called. Other specialists identiﬁed the working environment,
with a strong hierarchical structure and a practice of scolding junior
staff for unnecessary questions or faults theymight havemade, as a
main barrier for consultations; “I think we should realize that we are
the ones who have done them that way” (Specialist A).
Residents had divergent opinions of the support from special-
ists, but most stated that specialists were absent from the practical
work. The majority of residents wanted to have a closer commu-
nication with the specialist, but feared that calling the specialist
would mark them as “incompetent” and “disturbing”. Midwives
witnessed that residents were often “put down” during rounds, and
that they were reluctant to phone specialists during calls because
the specialist might get angry. This could also be observed during
participant observations. Some residents felt uncomfortable in
handling the specialists' private patients during the night, and
stated that when they contacted the specialists, they were often
advised to perform CS despite lack of medical indication. Some
residents stressed that most specialists were uncomfortable with
instrumental deliveries, and therefore unable to teach it to the
residents, which led to unnecessary CSs.
3.4. Residentemidwife interaction
Although both residents and midwives stated that CS decisions
were taken in consensus, there appeared to be tension between the
groups. This tension seemed partly to originate in a notion that the
responsibility of poor outcomes after vaginal delivery would fall on
the midwife, while poor outcomes after CS were the residents'
problem. Many residents perceived midwives as negative towards
conservative management and operative vaginal delivery, and felt
pushed to perform CS; “Sometimes you can be called by a midwife
and maybe she has already seen the woman and thinks that ‘this
woman has to go for CS.’ And when you discuss with her, you see that
there is no good reason. Now you enter into some sort of friction and
conﬂict. Maybe the beds are full, maybe the midwives don't want to
have many patients to monitor, to deliver normally, so they want to
decongest [the labor ward] a little (…) You might enter into a situation
of decision of unnecessary CS because of the, you know, friction with
the midwives” (Resident C). According to residents, midwives had
several strategies to make the woman undergo CS. One was to
neglect doctors' orders of augmentation of labor, which could lead
to poor progress and eventually CS. Another was to prepare women
for operation without discussing with the resident ﬁrst, something
that was also observed by the main researcher. Residents stated
that if there were disagreements around the CS decision, the
midwife who had opted for CS noted her standpoint in the medical
record; “They write them [notes in the medical record] for their own,
for their own purposes. To clean their hands” (Resident D). If therewas
a poor outcome, the resident's assessment would stand against the
midwife's assessment, and the midwives always supported each
other; “And you will ﬁnd yourself alone” (Resident F).
Midwives in both interviews and FGD emphasized their own
expertise, experience, and role in CS decisions. They often felt,
however, that their profession was not recognized, and there were
sometimes conﬂicts with the residents, especially during the resi-
dents' ﬁrst years; “When residents come in, we are their teachers, you
see? Many times they follow what we tell them. When these junior
doctors come in, they come with an attitude. (…) When we tell them
stuff, they pretend they know this and that. Those who listen to us,
things usually go well for them. The stubborn ones get very bad out-
comes. This is why they later change and cooperate with us” (Midwife
D). Midwives conﬁrmed that they sometimes pushed residents to
do CS, but only for what they perceived were genuine indications.
They rejected the idea that CS would relieve their workload, as
preparing and taking a woman for CS meant more work for them.
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operation before discussing with the doctor, as they felt they were
competent to take such decisions; “Even in the labor ward we do not
wait until the doctor comes to tell us what to do. I tell my colleagues
that how it is done here, to be honest, I don't like it. Our profession is
disrespected! A patient changed condition and I ask ‘What did you do?’
They say ‘I called the doctor.’ And I say ‘You called the doctor? So what?
What did you do as a professional? You should do this and this and
then you call a doctor!’” (Midwife H). If residents disagreed with
midwives' advice to perform CS, midwives stated that they some-
times called directly to the specialist to get support for a CS deci-
sion, as seniors appreciated midwives' experience. Midwives saw
documentation as oneway to solve conﬂicts around CS decisions, as
it would free them from responsibility if their CS advice was not
followed.
3.5. Fear and blame
All caregivers expressed a pronounced fear of poor outcomes,
especially related to situations with signs of fetal distress or poor
progress of labor, trial of labor in a woman with a previous scar,
induction of labor, or instrumental delivery. Generally, fear seemed
to focus more on poor perinatal outcomes after vaginal delivery
thanmaternal complications after unnecessary CS. Some caregivers
mentioned that fear of litigation or patient complaints led to
medically unjustiﬁed CSs, however, no-one had experience of such
a case, and given women's low status, most regarded the risk as
low. On the other hand, caregivers stated that the regular meetings
and statements to the hospital management affected their de-
cisions. The morning meetings, where residents and interns on the
on-call team reported outcomes during the last 24 h, were
described as “intense”, “hot”, and “condemning”; “unfortunately it is
never, never, a learning session” (Resident F). Through observations,
the main researcher could see how junior staff were scolded by
seniors in these meetings. While a few respondents considered the
weekly maternal mortality meetings as useful for pinpointing and
preventing mistakes, most described them as uncomfortable; “If
you are the one who attended that patient, you won't feel good. Most
of the time you will keep quiet. And sometimes they will… yeah. There
is no need to mention the names…” (Midwife I, FGD). Caregivers also
expressed discomfort with the statements they should write to the
hospital management for adverse outcomes, and, as illustrated in
the following quote, caregivers tried to avoid adverse outcomes not
only for the sake of their patients, but also to avoid the evaluation
process; “Every low-score [newborn with signs of distress at birth],
there must be a reason why. So the statement should answer this. (…)
Everyone should be able to go back to see why; why low-score? That is
why we don't want a low-score.” (Midwife J, FGD). None of the re-
spondents mentioned useful changes that had resulted from these
sessions or statements, or that they had received support from the
management in difﬁcult situations.
The fear of blame from colleagues involved all respondents, but
was most pronounced among residents and midwives. There
seemed to be a notion among residents that they could avoid blame
by doing CSwithout proper indication instead of waiting for vaginal
delivery and risk a poor perinatal outcome; ”They [the residents] just
go to the theatre so that they will not to be called in the meetings”
(Resident E) and that this was more or less accepted among the
senior staff; “If the woman went to CS and she comes out safe and the
baby is safe, there is no very big harm on that. Despite that the indi-
cation was not appropriate. (…) It is not so bad compared to if CS was
supposed to be done and it was not done in time” (Specialist D).
Residents feared that if they were involved in poor outcomes,
specialists might be harder on them in the exams. Specialists
conﬁrmed that residents involved in repeated adverse outcomescould be “put in the black book” (Specialist A), something that might
affect their future career and force them to interrupt their studies.
4. Discussion
By exploring obstetric caregivers' rationales of their hospital's
high CS rate, we have identiﬁed aspects in the health care milieu
that could explain CS overuse. All caregivers rationalized the high
CS rate by referring to factors outside their control. In private
practice, economic incentives, apprehensions of patient com-
plaints, and maternal request, contributed to unnecessary CSs.
Residents stated that they often had insufﬁcient support from their
senior colleagues, and felt pushed by midwives to perform CS.
Many of these issues, as well as the medically doubtful CS in-
dications, seemed to be related to caregivers' fear of being blamed
by colleagues and management in the case of poor outcomes.
4.1. Withdrawing from and dislocating responsibility
As stated by our respondents, due to an extensive shortage of
resources at the peripheral hospitals, the university hospital han-
dles a high proportion of Dar es Salaam's needed CSs. Maternal age
has also increased during latter years (Litorp et al., 2013), which
increases the risk of CS. The hospital's CS rate is, however, still high
after adjusting for referral status and maternal age (Litorp et al.,
2013). Caregivers also stressed that maternal request among pri-
vate patients was a major reason for CS overuse, and some seemed
to have adopted the “too posh to push-”rhetoric (Bagheri et al.,
2013; Lynn Bourgeault et al., 2008). Women, however, often
perceive CS as more painful than vaginal birth and react with shock
and fear when faced with a CS decision (Khan et al., 2012; Litorp
et al., 2015), which contradicts a large maternal demand. Care-
givers' overestimation of maternal request (Hopkins, 2000; Lynn
Bourgeault et al., 2008), and the way in which our respondents
withdrew from their responsibility in the hospital's high CS rate by
pointing to external factors, draws on theories about blame
avoidance and defense strategies (Allsop and Mulcahy, 1998; Hood,
2007; Mizrahi, 1984). Previous literature has described such stra-
tegies and reported how health care professionals use them to
dislocate responsibility for their actions to circumstances outside
their control (Allsop and Mulcahy, 1998; Mizrahi, 1984). Given
medical professionals' responsibility for life-and-death decisions,
and the way in which wrong decisions might have catastrophic
consequences, these strategies can act to lessen feelings of guilt,
maintain a sense of control, and reinforce professional identity
(Allsop and Mulcahy, 1998; Mizrahi, 1984).
4.2. Miscommunications and the lonely resident
Although many respondents emphasized the team-work, the
team spirit appeared stronger among midwives than between
midwives and doctors, or among doctors. Residents, who were
responsible for CS decisions during calls, seemed to be lonely and
mistrusted by both seniors andmidwives, and there appeared to be
competing roles between residents and midwives regarding who
was the ﬁnal decision maker. Midwives' drive for CS was an un-
expected ﬁnding, as midwives are often less enthusiastic about CS
than physicians (Monari et al., 2008). This drive seemed to arise
mainly from a fear of poor perinatal outcomes after vaginal de-
livery, in which case blame would be directed to the midwife. The
competition between residents and midwives might also result
from residents' insufﬁcient support from seniors and management,
midwives' feeling that their competence was not recognized, and a
lack of guidelines on what responsibilities each staff has. Failure in
team-work and communication are among the top causes of
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illustrate how caregivers' assumptions about each other's charac-
teristics and behavior might create misconceptions, communica-
tion barriers, and CS overuse.4.3. Transparency, reactivity, and CS overuse
Previous literature has described how fear of litigation can lead
to defensive practice and medically unjustiﬁed CSs (Allsop and
Mulcahy, 1998; Bagheri et al., 2013; Fuglenes et al., 2009; Habiba
et al., 2006; Monari et al., 2008), but we also suggest that the
way in which staff were observed and evaluated contributed to CS
overuse. In Fig. 2, we illustrate how transparency might induce
reactivity mechanisms, alter behavior, and have unintended effects
(McGivern and Fischer, 2010, 2012; Strathern, 2000). The trans-
parency process, with meetings, audit sessions, and writtenFig. 1. Obstetric caregivers' assumptions about each other's characteristics and behavior, wstatements, created fear, anxiety and distress: specialists with pri-
vate practice feared patient complaints and bad reputation, resi-
dents feared disciplinary actions but at the same time hesitated to
consult their seniors as this might mark them as incompetent,
midwives feared poor perinatal outcomes after vaginal delivery.
Caregivers had also reconstructed (Erlandson et al., 1993; Waring,
2009) their view of CS. Despite evidence that CS without medical
indication is associated with increased maternal risks (Souza et al.,
2010), CS had become a “rescue”, a safe procedure that would
protect caregivers from blame. Senior doctors seemed to react to
the emotional distress with detachment, and instead of sympa-
thetically supporting junior colleagues and midwives, they
responded with repression and reprimand (Menzies, 1960). Care-
givers had also shifted their focus from prioritizing to avoid
maternal CS complications to prioritizing to avoid poor perinatal
outcomes after vaginal delivery, of which the latter were morehich may create misconceptions and communication barriers, and lead to CS overuse.
Fig. 2. Model of how transparency might induce reactivity mechanisms and have unintended effects, such as an overuse of caesarean section (CS) (examples from our data given as
footnotes aef). a Staff meetings, audits of adverse events, statements to the hospital management. b Fear, anxiety, guilt, distress. c “CS without medical indication is not harmful”, “CS
protects the care-giver from blame”. d Management and senior staff use repression, disciplinary action, and reprimand to handle adverse events. e Staff prioritize perinatal outcomes
over maternal outcomes, staff prioritize documentation, staff prioritize to safe-guard themselves over making medically correct decisions, staff prioritize short-term complications
visible in the evaluation process over long-term complications of CS overuse. f CS overuse: CS decision in cases with dubious signs of fetal distress or obstructed labor, reluctance to
let women with previous scar try labor, reluctance to perform induction, reluctance to try instrumental delivery.
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2007). To illustrate this, the CS rate increased from 36% in 2007,
when perinatal audit was introduced, to 51% in 2011, perhaps partly
due to an increased attention on perinatal outcomes. However, in a
recent, yet unpublished, study from2014, 46% of CSs performed due
to “fetal distress” did not meet the criteria for such diagnosis
(Andrew Mgaya, personal communication). In the same manner,
caregivers focused more on the short-term outcomes for which
they were individually accountable, rather than on the long-term
consequences of CS overuse (Litorp et al., 2015). Thus, the trans-
parency process had created a new performance orientation, where
the outcome of the evaluation had become equally, or even more,
important than the outcome of the patient (Espeland and Sauder,
2007; McGivern and Fischer, 2010, 2012). This working environ-
ment, where conservative management and alternative in-
terventions to CS might lead to blame, contributed to CSs that were
socially sanctioned but medically doubtful.
Our ﬁndings call for a critical assessment of the leadership at
higher levels. Hospital managements have the outermost re-
sponsibility for implementing changes suggested by the audit
process, as well as guaranteeing that the evaluation of staff does not
have perverse effects. Lack of accountability among managements
and political authorities does, however, often transfer re-
sponsibility of adverse outcomes on individual caregivers. Audit
systems that fail to identify and address real causes of adverse
events, including underlying conﬂicts and emotional reactions, are
likely to create disengagement and suggest ineffective in-
terventions (Nicolini et al., 2011). Despite recent years' focus on
“objective” auditing, informal supervision and sharing of knowl-
edge between staff should not be underestimated as contributors to
patient safety and learning (Waring and Bishop, 2010), but require
the presence and commitment of seniors. By collective re-
sponsibility, checking decisions against set, commonly agreed
criteria, or checking between individuals through shared decision
making or obligatory second opinion (Althabe et al., 2004), pro-
fessional's individual anxiety might decrease (McGivern and Ferlie,2007; Menzies, 1960).
4.4. Strengths and limitations
The qualitative design of this study allowed us to get a deeper
understanding of the mechanisms behind CS overuse. The main
researcher's position as an “outsider”, yet a colleague who had
spent six months in the study context, appeared to enhance
openness and trust during interviews. Validity of ﬁndings was
sought in several ways (Erlandson et al., 1993). Prolonged engage-
ment started in 2010, when we conducted a quantitative study at
the hospital. Member checks, including peer-checks, were done to
verify our results. We triangulated our ﬁndings by including
different categories of respondents (specialists, residents, and
midwives) and by using different methods (interviews, FGDs, and
observations). Although opinions varied, responses from special-
ists, residents, and midwives largely cohered and complemented
each other, as did data collected through interviews, FGDs, and
observations. By having a multi-professional team, different angles
and inputs were provided, which stimulated our discussions.
As all qualitative ﬁndings are deﬁned by the speciﬁc context in
which they occur (Erlandson et al., 1993), generalizability is limited.
Our ﬁndings are of particular interest to other low-income coun-
tries, in which the use of clinical audit is increasing (Richard et al.,
2009) and blame during the audit session has been described
previously (Combs Thorsen et al., 2014). The phenomena might,
however, be applicable also in other settings globally, as we
recognize several of these aspects from our own work as obstetric
caregivers in high-income countries. One of the study's limitations
is that data from FGDs were not as rich as those from individual
interviews, which might be due to caregivers' high workloads and
colliding schedules. For these reasons, we did not attempt to
arrange a FGD with specialists. Translated transcripts can also
introduce bias since meaning may get lost in translation. In our
study, we kept culture-speciﬁc quotes in Kiswahili and transcrip-
tion, translation, and analysis were done by research group
H. Litorp et al. / Social Science & Medicine 143 (2015) 232e240 239members in constant dialogue to retain authenticity.
5. Conclusion
We have presented how caregivers withdraw from their re-
sponsibility of rising CS rates, the role of private practice in high CS
rates, how dysfunctional team-work can lead to unnecessary CSs,
and how transparency and auditing can create a new performance
orientationwhere staffs prioritize to safeguard themselves. In order
to address the problem with medically unjustiﬁed CSs, caregivers
need to acknowledge their role as decision-makers and medical
experts and strive to minimize unnecessary CSs. Incentives and
policies related to private practice should be arranged so that CSs
without proper indications are not promoted. Junior doctors need
to be supported and empowered by both management and senior
colleagues, for example by introducing mandatory second opinion
on CS decisions and having guidelines on what criteria should be
fulﬁlled for CS decisions. Conﬂicts and competition between
different categories of staff might decrease if each player's
competence and autonomy is respected. Lastly, instituting a
learning climate free of blame is crucial, as fear of blame from
colleagues might lead to CS overuse. Although transparency and
auditing are important to improve patient safety, theymust be used
wisely and with sensitivity for any unintended effects they might
have. The management has the outermost responsibility for guar-
anteeing that audit sessions illuminate and attend to structural
problems, rather than blame individual caregivers.
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